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A Fair Return Approach to 
Pharmaceutical Compulsory 
Licensing 
Maura Nuno 
This article argues that universal access to drugs requires 
not only collaboration between nations and patent holders, but 
also the creation of a neutral International Panel. Under the 
supervision of a Neutral International Panel, the disequilibrium 
created by the current system of global intellectual property 
protection can be equalized to improve access to drugs without 
undermining pharmaceutical companies and intellectual property 
rights. 
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I. Introduction 
Innovation is the solution to global health problems, but as long 
as innovators are not inherently altruistic, the developing world will 
be deprived of access to life saving drugs. Under the current 
framework for the protection of intellectual property, pharmaceutical 
companies receive property protection and set market prices. The 
framework allows pharmaceutical companies to justify their supra-
competitive prices based on the need to recuperate innovation 
 
 J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law; B.A., Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, June 
2012.   
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expenses. Because drug development is timely and expensive, with a 
high risk of failure, governments are inclined to provide 
pharmaceutical companies with strong intellectual property protection 
and greater profit margins than would exist in a competitive system 
to induce them to assume the risks.1 The genius of the patent system 
is that it harnesses the market system to determine the reward for 
patent holders. However, this means that access is determined by the 
ability to pay, and some people may be deprived of access.   
The World Trade Organization (WTO) established the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement 
to strike a balance between protecting patent holders and giving the 
public access to inventions. The agreement included a provision for 
compulsory licensing that would permit a government to allow 
someone else, usually a generic manufacturer, to produce a drug 
without the explicit consent of the patent owner. Although TRIPS 
defined certain qualifications for issuing compulsory licenses, countries 
retained broad discretion over when to grant compulsory licenses and 
how to establish adequate remuneration. The Doha Declaration,2 
enacted in 2001, was intended to clarify some of the confusion about 
compulsory licenses but instead left the adequate remuneration 
language untouched and did little to coordinate the international 
system.3 
 
1. Industry figures show that on average, pharmaceutical companies spend 
$1.3 billion on research and development of a new drug over a period of 
ten to twelve years. This figure suggests not all drugs cost the same but 
fails to detail the distribution of cost around this average. WAYNE 
TAYLOR, PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: ON 
THE GROUND BARRIERS AND INDUSTRY SUCCESS 8 (2010), 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17815en/s17815en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5JYW-3AWH]. 
2. The Doha Declaration recognized that member nations should not strive 
to uphold the TRIPS Agreement at the expense of the nations’ public 
health. The clarification embodied in the Doha Declaration resulted 
from an increasing concern over public health problems affecting the 
developing and least-developed countries. See World, Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 
(Nov. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_tri
ps_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6MD-AZV8]. 
3. The Doha declaration did try to improve access to some drugs by 
allowing countries to use their power to issue compulsory licenses to 
support the production of generic drugs for export.   However, the effort 
has proven to be insufficient and leaves the current system of state-by-
state policy making relatively untouched. See Alan O. Sykes, Public 
Health and International Law: TRIPS Pharmaceuticals, Developing 
Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2002).     
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Even if consumers from countries housing the top-ten largest 
pharmaceutical companies can feasibly pay the market price for 
drugs, these same prices shut out consumers in the developing world. 
The existing framework of TRIPS creates a reciprocal arrangement 
between countries where all member countries must recognize and 
protect each others’ domestic intellectual property rights.4 The 
arrangement is challenged when developing nations are forced to 
choose between upholding intellectual property rights and granting 
their citizens access to medicines. In those instances, developing 
nations resort to compulsory licensing. As a result, both patent 
holders and countries are subject to criticism, litigation, and monetary 
loss for their respective actions concerning the compulsory license.  
This Note proposes the establishment of a neutral International 
Panel to review pharmaceutical compulsory licenses and provide 
patent holders with an impartial review of adequate remuneration. 
Part I introduces the paradigm created by the need for innovation 
matched against society’s ability to pay market prices. Part II 
outlines the global system of intellectual property protection under 
TRIPS and Part III deconstructs the consequences of imposing a 
global patent system with no global coordination. Part IV proposes 
the creation of an International Panel specifically designed to 
exclusively entertain disputes over pharmaceutical compulsory 
licenses. Establishing a neutral International Panel for compulsory 
license disputes should ameliorate the struggle between 
pharmaceutical companies and developing countries while increasing 
global access to life saving drugs. 
II. Innovation Costs vs. Ability to Pay 
The patent system is premised on compensating innovators for 
the costs and risks associated with developing new ideas through 
temporary market control.5 Patent rights assume a system at 
equilibrium where innovators will recover the costs of innovation 
without surplus or supra-competitive gains. On a national scale, this 
system is thought to assure that innovators will have the incentive to 
invest in research and that the public will enjoy the benefits of their 
innovation. The system harnesses the market by requiring those who 
benefit from the drug to pay the cost of investing in the drug. But, 
once domestic patent protection rights are engrafted on other 
 
4. Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8XUU-HV7U] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
5. See Stanley M. Bensen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law 
and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (1991).  
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countries who make individual and disconnected decisions about 
access to medicines, the equilibrium of the system is disturbed. 
In developed countries, access to drugs is regulated by national 
governments and insurance systems, which can determine “how to 
spread the financial burden of the system among potential 
beneficiaries.”6 Governments can also choose to subsidize the cost of 
innovation through government-funded research or the healthcare 
system.7 In contrast, the developing world lacks the infrastructure or 
system to spread the financial burden across beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, there is no coordination between countries concerning 
the reward for innovation and the ability of each country to pay. This 
uncoordinated system of international patent rights leads countries to 
take unilateral action to the detriment of patent holders and the 
TRIPS agreement as a whole. For example, in 1997, Brazil passed 
legislation authorizing a local company to produce a specific medicine 
without the consent of the patent holder.8 In this example, Brazil took 
unilateral action to remedy insufficient access to that medication in 
its country without negotiating with the patent holder’s country of 
origin.  
Without an International Panel, it is impossible to fairly 
determine whether pharmaceutical companies are being over or 
undercompensated for their innovations. Further, there is no way to 
resolve the distributive issue — “the determination of which . . . 
countries should bear the burden of providing the incentive”—without 
a coordination system.9 In fact, even with a presiding International 
Panel, the distributive issue would be difficult to resolve given the 
concentration of pharmaceutical companies in only a handful of 
countries.  
III. The Current System 
TRIPS was enacted to promote the transfer and dissemination of 
technology through the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
 
6. Peter Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 155 
(2007).  
7. Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-
technology/21572735-cutting-american-health-research-will-harm-world-
bad-medicine [https://perma.cc/MK2M-PYZG].  
8. Christie Mount, Brazil’s Defiant AIDS Program: A Model for the 
Developing World, COUNCIL HEMISPHERIC AFF. (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.coha.org/brazils-defiant-aids-program-a-model-for-the-
developing-world/ [https://perma.cc/9ZV7-BJ6E]. 
9. Gerhart, supra note 6, at 158. 
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property rights10 by establishing “minimum levels of protection that 
each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow 
WTO members.”11 When a member government determines its 
citizens cannot pay the market price for a drug, they are first 
encouraged to seek voluntary licenses from the patent holder. Under a 
voluntary license, the petitioning country is authorized to use 
patented material by the patent holder under “reasonable commercial 
terms.”12 Additionally, Article 31 of TRIPS creates an exception to 
the exclusive right of the patent holder to determine the drug supplier 
and manufacturer. Under Article 31, a member government may allow 
“someone else to produce the patented product or process without the 
consent of the patent owner,” therefore issuing a compulsory license.13 
Before a government may issue a compulsory license, the proposed 
user must show proof of unsuccessful attempts to obtain a voluntary 
license over a “reasonable period of time.”14 Further, the agreement 
provides an additional exception in cases of “national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use,” where the issuing government need not demonstrate 
an initial attempt to obtain the patent holder’s authorization before 
issuing a compulsory license.15 
Despite the exception to strong intellectual property protection, 
the compulsory license issuer must pay “adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization.”16 The language of TRIPS fails to delineate a 
process for determining adequate remuneration and therefore gives the 
issuing government wide discretion in determining appropriate royalty 
rates. As such, the issuing country may unilaterally decide to issue a 
compulsory license once favorable negotiations cannot be met and set 
the royalty rate according to their own measures of adequacy. Access 
to drugs is an important consideration for TRIPS and by demanding 
 
10. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, art. 1, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the 
Uruguay Round 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
11. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WHO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HZP3-UHQC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
12. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WTO, available 
at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.ht
m [https://perma.cc/5J66-8WU3] (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. TRIPS supra note 10, at art. 31(b).  
16. TRIPS, supra note 10, at art 31(h).    
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royalty rates, no matter how minimal, it ensures pharmaceutical 
companies will at least obtain some profit from developing nations, 
which they would not otherwise receive because citizens of developing 
countries could never purchase the drugs at market value.  
Further complicating the paradox created by the ambiguity of 
“adequate remuneration,” the agreement provides that the judiciary 
branch or some higher authority from the issuing country shall review 
determinations about remuneration for compulsory licenses.17 A 
pharmaceutical company dissatisfied with the compulsory license or 
the issuing country’s determination of what constitutes adequate 
remuneration must seek relief through that nation’s judicial system. 
In order for that clause to be carried out successfully, the countries 
issuing compulsory licenses would need to provide a mechanism for 
impartial review.  
Pharmaceutical companies that have attempted to challenge 
compulsory licenses using the issuing nation’s laws failed and 
significantly damaged their public image in the process.18 In November 
of 2001, WTO members met in Doha, Qatar to clarify ambiguities in 
the TRIPS agreement and to pacify the developing nations unsatisfied 
with the current interpretation of TRIPS so that new negotiation 
rounds could be commenced.19 The Doha Declaration provided an 
authoritative interpretation of TRIPS so that members would 
recognize another member’s right to take measures to protect public 
health and promote drug access.20 The Doha Declaration changed the 
provision in the TRIPS Agreement that restricted compulsory licenses 
to mainly supply the domestic market.21 The new understanding of the 
Article 31 exception allows countries unable to manufacture drugs 
domestically to obtain cheaper versions from other countries.22 
Additionally, the least developed countries may delay conformity to 
the TRIPS minimum standards of protection for pharmaceutical 
 
17. TRIPS, supra note 10, at art 31(j).    
18. See Ellen F. M.’T Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to 
Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 30-
31 (2003) (discussing the backlash that drug companies faced for 
challenging the South African legal framework).  
19. Carlo Trojan, The Developing Countries Came of Age in Doha, EUR. 
AFF. (2002), available at 
http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/component/content/article
?id=389:the-developing-countries-came-of-age-in-doha 
[https://perma.cc/K43R-XVLV] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).  
20. James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies and 
New Methods of Stimulating R&D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 682 
(2007).     
21. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12. 
22. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12. 
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patents until 2016.23 Therefore, the least-developed countries, not yet 
required to meet the minimum standards of protections, should not 
benefit from the compulsory license exception until after 2016. As a 
result, developing countries will be the most active players on the 
compulsory licensing agenda. 
IV. Disequilibrium in the Current System 
The existing framework for global intellectual property protection 
of pharmaceuticals compensates pharmaceutical companies for 
research and development costs at the expense of global access to life 
saving drugs. Not only does the framework give inadequate attention 
to access, but the inadequacies lead to:  (1) insufficient royalty 
payments under compulsory licenses and no proper judicial oversight; 
(2) damaging public relations incidents; (3) neglect of orphan diseases; 
and (4) a rise in the counterfeit drug market. The shortcomings of the 
existing framework are the result of uncoordinated distribution costs 
leaving pharmaceutical companies and developing countries alike 
dissatisfied with the status quo. Imposing impartial oversight for 
compulsory licenses would result in overall greater global access to 
drugs and the emergence of untapped markets.  
A. Insufficient Royalty Payments under Compulsory Licensing  
The patent system rewards innovators for assuming the risk and 
cost of research and development by giving patent owners the right to 
exclude others from using or producing their product for a certain 
amount of time so that they may recoup their expenses. Under the 
premise of recovering the cost of research and development, 
pharmaceutical companies are free to set inaccessibly high market 
prices for their drugs. This means, that some countries, those with 
citizens that can’t afford market prices and where government 
subsidies are not enough to make the drugs affordable, are effectively 
forced to request a voluntary license or unilaterally issue a compulsory 
license to provide their citizens with access to certain drugs. Because 
voluntary licensing involves negotiations between two highly 
interested parties, the government seeking a voluntary license and the 
patent holder, negotiations are unlikely to result in terms agreeable to 
both. Thus, voluntary licenses are usually issued as a result of public 
pressure or legal action.24 And even though the WTO imposes an 
 
23. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12. 
24. TAHIR AMIN, VOLUNTARY LICENSING PRACTICES IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO IMPROVING 
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE MEDICINES? 13 (2007), available at 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/129694/1099999/1192729231567/
Oxfam+-
+Voluntary+Licensing+Research+IMAK+Website.pdf?token=WmNw
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unwritten obligation on members to bargain in good faith, 
governments seeking a voluntary license bargain with the knowledge 
that if agreeable terms cannot be established they may unilaterally 
issue a compulsory license. This system imposes high bargaining costs 
for pharmaceutical companies faced with the possibility of compulsory 
licenses and the notion that there is no widely accepted international 
standard for reasonable return rates.  
Allowing each country issuing a compulsory license to set its own 
royalty rate effectively deprives pharmaceutical companies of any 
control over the return rate for their inventions. In such a system, 
there is no guarantee to the patent owner that a royalty rate will not 
be disproportionally low or high to the country’s actual ability to pay. 
Countries issuing compulsory licenses are encouraged to adopt the 
Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary use of a Patent on 
Medical Technologies (Remuneration Guidelines) created by WHO 
and the Bureau for Development Policy of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) because they are the simplest, but 
countries can choose any of the existing guidelines or even develop 
their own.25  
Most guidelines use a base rate of 4 percent that can be adjusted 
for special circumstances including the country’s rank in the Human 
Development Index, utilization factor, and therapeutic value.26 WHO 
Remuneration Guidelines adjust the 4 percent base rate by plus or 
minus 2 percent for the product’s therapeutic value or the 
government’s role in financing research and development.27 A trifle 
two-percent plus-or-minus difference cannot be expected to account 
for the wide range of varying circumstances affecting each applicant. 
Moreover, with each country being free to choose with guidelines to 
use there can be no consistency among countries. Using these 
guidelines, pharmaceutical companies cannot expect to obtain a fair 
return on their innovations. 
India’s negotiations with the pharmaceutical company Bayer are a 
recent example of an ineffective license agreement under the current 
system. In 2012, India issued its first compulsory license for Nexavar, 
a compound used to treat advanced stages of kidney and liver 
 
mWc9nyaS%2B%2BPM0t2TRNXi4k4%3D [https://perma.cc/E5AS-
8N9z]. 
25. Love, supra note 20, at 688-689. 
26. Love, supra note 20, at 688-689. 
27. JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR 
NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT 7 (Robert Weissman ed., 2005), 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications
/hiv-aids/access-to-drugs-via-compulsory-licensing-guidelines--non-
voluntary-patent-use/22.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE59-HCNK]. 
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cancer.28 Bayer obtained a license to import Nexavar into India in 
2007, but did not import Nexavar in 2008 and only imported the drug 
in small quantities in 2009 and 2010.29 Under Indian intellectual 
property law, failing to work a patent domestically is cause for 
forfeiture of the patent, which has gradually turned into a system of 
compulsory licensing instead.30  In response, Natco Pharmaceutical, a 
national drug manufacturing company, applied for a compulsory 
license and was granted authorization to produce Bayer’s patented 
cancer drug for domestic sale with a 6 percent royalty rate on net 
sales of the drug payable to Bayer on a quarterly basis.31  
During negotiations for a voluntary license, the initial step in this 
process, Bayer requested royalty payments of 15 percent of net sales, 
but negotiations failed and India granted Natco Pharmaceutical a 
compulsory license.32 Bayer appealed the grant of the compulsory 
license to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”) who 
upheld the order, but raised the royalty rate to 7 percent.33 In their 
considerations, the board dismissed Bayer’s argument for 
remuneration noting “expenditure incurred by the appellant is not the 
criterion, nor does this chapter intend[] that the patentee be enabled 
to recoup the amount spent.”34 Bayer then brought the issue to the 
Mumbai High Court, which dismissed the issue noting: “we don’t see 
a reason to interfere with the order passed by IPAB, and therefore, 
the case is dismissed.”35 Lastly, Bayer filed a petition with the 
 
28. Marciel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory License, for Bayer 
Cancer Drug at Intel, I.P. WATCH (Dec. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grants-first-compulsory-
licence-for-bayer-cancer-drug/ [https://perma.cc/DJ9H-52ST]. 
29. Id. 
30. Jerome H. Reichman, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions, 
UNCTAD-ICTSD 1 (2003), 
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WXF8-XKWW].  
31. Natco Pharm. Ltd. v. Bayer Corp.,(2011) C.L.A.No.1 (India), available 
at 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CW8Y-5FAS]. 
32. Estavillo, supra note 28.  
33. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et. al., Order No. 45/2013 (India). 
34. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et al. (Bayer Corp. v. India), Order No. 
223/2012 (India), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-223-
2012-OA-35-2012-PT-MUM.pdf [http://perma.cc/BDT3-PY32]. 
35. Bombay High Court Refused to Interfere with IPAB Order in Nexavar 
Compulsory License Case, LEXORBIS (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.lexorbis.com/bombay-high-court-refused-to-interfere-with-
ipab-order-in-nexavar-compulsory-license-case/#acceptLicense 
[https://perma.cc/D7A7-G67T]. 
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Supreme Court of India, which refused to entertain Bayer’s Special 
Leave Petition against the Mumbai High Court’s decision.36  
This recent sequence of events illustrates the inevitable dilemma 
created by an international agreement restricting a pharmaceutical 
company’s remedies to the judicial system of the compulsory license-
issuing nation. Bayer diligently appealed to the adequate courts in 
India and followed protocol, but was denied actual appellate review. 
India’s high court and Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal 
and gave deference to the decision of the IPAB. Simultaneously, 
Bayer was forced to engage in a public relations battle against a 
nation that seemingly afforded the pharmaceutical company appellate 
review but in fact dismissed the matter.  
B. Public Relations Battles are a Waste of Resources 
When pharmaceutical companies like Bayer must use financial 
resources to defend their intellectual property, they divest funds from 
research and development. On average, pharmaceutical companies 
spend one-third of all sales revenue on marketing their products,37 and 
an average of $4 billion on research and development for a single 
drug.38 Arguably, pharmaceutical companies also enjoy the highest 
profit margins on the market. For example, Pfizer, the world’s largest 
pharmaceutical company, ended 2013 with a 42 percent profit 
margin.39 While the amounts spent on advertising seem excessive and 
irrational, the public fails to consider the reasons why pharmaceutical 
companies must invest such large sums in marketing. In addition to 
the standard cost of maintaining public interest, pharmaceutical 
companies are constantly fighting a public relations battle.40 In today’s 
 
36. Supreme Court Says No to Bayer, Upholds Compulsory License on 
Nexavar, INFO JUSTICE (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://infojustice.org/archives/33690 [https://perma.cc/7D8N-JZ5K] 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
37. Pharmaceutical Industry, WHO, available at 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/5RBP-WU94] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
38. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, 
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-
staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/HK38-
KMA4]. 
39. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
28212223 [https://perma.cc/AB8U-P6DF]. 
40. Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. BOOKS 
(July 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/the-truth-
about-the-drug-companies/ [https://perma.cc/R7L7-UHKD]. 
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age, pharmaceutical companies are both revered and hated by the 
public for their innovations and unsightly escalating drug costs. 
In 1998, thirty-nine multinational pharmaceutical companies sued 
Nelson Mandela and the South African government challenging 
legislation that would allow the South African government to 
“purchase brand-name drugs at the lowest rates available anywhere in 
the world,” without prior approval.41 Pharmaceutical companies 
alleged the legislation violated the South African constitution and the 
TRIPS agreement.42 During the three-year legal dispute, 
pharmaceutical companies closed factories and canceled investments 
in South Africa.43 Initially, the United States government supported 
the pharmaceutical industry’s claim by withholding trade benefits and 
threatening trade sanctions against South Africa.44 International 
public outrage at the pharmaceutical companies’ seemingly insensitive 
actions forced the United States to withdraw support, and prompted 
the eventual negotiations between pharmaceutical companies and the 
South African government.45  In the end, the pharmaceutical 
companies conceded that South African law could be implemented as 
it was, and agreed to pay the South African government’s legal 
costs.46  
This case demonstrates the futility of raging a political war 
against nations attempting to increase access to lifesaving drugs. 
Pharmaceutical companies failed to overturn the legislation, severely 
damaged their public image and lost an estimated $286,000 in court 
costs.47 J.P. Garnier, chief executive of GlaxoSmithKlein, said in 
 
41. Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Maker Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS 
Medicine at Intel, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/world/drug-makers-drop-south-
africa-suit-over-aids-medicine.html [https://perma.cc/C5WK-HX2W]. 
42. Joel Lexchin, Canada and access to medicines in developing countries: 
intellectual property rights first, Globalization and Health (2013), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3844468/pdf/1744-
8603-9-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4NV-YZYH]. 
43. Swarns, supra note 41. 
44. 1998: Big Pharma Versus Nelson Mandela, M.S.F. ACCESS (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/1998-big-pharma-versus-nelson-
mandela [https://perma.cc/Z7UE-G96G]. 
45. Swarns, supra note 41. 
46. WILLIAM W. FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA 
AIDS CONTROVERSY: A CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9 
(2005), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJC7-2CFG]. 
47. Ann M. Simmons, Suit Against Cheap AIDS Drugs Ends in S. Africa at 
Intel, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), available at 
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response to the decision to withdraw the lawsuit, “[w]e have never 
been opposed to wider access. We have discounted our drugs. We’ve 
done everything we could. Frankly, the legislation was the worst 
distraction. It did not allow us to communicate our message 
effectively.”48 When pharmaceutical companies feel apprehensive over 
the degree of patent protection awarded in a given country, they will 
respond defensively. Such defensive actions contribute to the high 
marketing costs spent by pharmaceutical companies to maintain 
customer loyalty in light of bad public presence and to obtain new 
customers.  
Despite the disappointing outcome of the South African 
legislation challenge, pharmaceutical companies launched a similar 
attack on the Brazilian government in 2001.49 Brazil’s 1997 legislation 
reserved the “right to authorize a local company to produce ARVs50 
without the permission of the patent holder, regardless of the 
pharmaceutical company’s country of origin.”51 Pharmaceutical 
companies felt threatened by the implications of such legislation and 
urged the United States to challenge the legislation at the WTO 
conference in Qatar.52 In January 2001, the U.S. Trade Representative 
filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against 
Brazil’s patent laws authorizing compulsory licensing.53 As a result of 
heavy international criticism, the U.S. Trade Representative withdrew 
the complaint on June 25, 2001.54 Brazil, however, privately agreed to 
give the United States advanced notice of any future plans to issue 
compulsory licenses.55 
 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/20/news/mn-53295 
[https://perma.cc/WE8H-HVPY]. 
48. Swarns, supra note 41. 
49. Mount, supra note 8. 
50. Standard antiretroviral therapy (ART) consists of a combination of at 
least three antiretroviral (ARV) drugs to suppress HIV. As explanation, 
see Use of Antiretrovirals for Treatment and Prevention of HIV 
Infection, WHO, available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/treatment/en/ [https://perma.cc/687Y-
VZAR] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
51. Mount, supra note 8. 
52. Mount, supra note 8. 
53. Jennryn Wetzler & Ana Ayala, Timeline on Brazil’s Compulsory 
Licensing, PROGRAM INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. WASH. C. L. AM. U. 
(2008), available at 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/download.cfm?downloadfile=9C010
7B5-DE2F-4E48-6CE8D03F4933FCD4 [https://perma.cc/3TXW-
U3VC].  
54. Id. 
55. Id.  
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Ineffective intellectual protection drives pharmaceutical companies 
to respond defensively to national efforts to increase access. This 
aggressive behavior, and the public relations nightmare it creates, 
feeds into the vicious cycle of increasing pharmaceutical costs. The 
pharmaceutical industry, like all other industries, must bear the cost 
of market competition and particularly the cost of generic drug 
alternatives. Amending public image problems should not be added to 
the steep marketing costs.  
C. Orphan Diseases 
The top ten largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, 
controlling one-third of the pharmaceutical industry, are all located in 
first-world countries and mainly supported by the private sector.56 In 
first-world countries, both private and public funding supports 
research and development for the sake of innovation and much of the 
funding benefits the medical field. In the U.S., the National Institute 
of Health’s research underpinned five of America’s twenty best selling 
drugs.57 Unfortunately, developing nations do not enjoy the same type 
of financial support available to research organizations in the first 
world. Under this framework, pharmaceutical companies lack the 
incentive to invest in the research and development necessary to 
create treatments for orphan diseases, rare diseases affecting a small 
number of individuals, because they would prefer to allow government 
funded institutions to bear that risk. 
In the United States, an orphan disease is one that affects fewer 
than 200,000 people nationwide, but in Japan it’s fewer than 50,000 
individuals, and fewer than 2,000 in Australia.58 The different 
thresholds are proportional to the nation’s population size, and 
indicate the baseline of affected individuals necessary to spike 
pharmaceutical interest. The difference, however, is that first-world 
countries spend billions of dollars on research across all fields.59 Given 
the high cost of research and development, pharmaceutical companies 
lack the incentive to research these rare diseases because the return 
rate is unlikely to cover the expense of the research or produce profit.  
 
56. Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 37.  
57. Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, supra note 7. 
58. J.K. Aronson, Rare Diseases and Orphan Drugs, 61 BRIT. J CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 243, 243-45 (2006), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1885017/ 
[https://perma.cc/4C92-L2X6]; Orphan Products: Hope for People with 
Rare Diseases, FDA (2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143563.ht
m [https://perma.cc/Y5TS-RHKZ]. 
59. Cutting American Health Research Will Harm the World, supra note 7 
(indicating that in 2011 the U.S. and the E.U. countries spent a 
combined $641 billion on research, while China spent $160 billion). 
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Developed nations address the orphan disease problem by 
inducing research and development through subsidies. A subsidy 
system for pharmaceutical research and development functions like 
insurance coverage: the risk is spread amongst all taxpayers who may 
or may not benefit from the results of the innovation.60 Countries like 
the United States, Japan, Australia, and the European Community 
mitigate the problem of orphan diseases by passing legislation 
encouraging research through “tax credits and research aids, 
simplification of marketing authorization procedures, and extended 
market exclusivity.”61 Orphan disease issues are more prominent in 
developing countries where government funds cannot be allocated to 
treat rare diseases.  
Developing drugs for orphan diseases is not cost-effective 
according to market standards; so pharmaceutical giants with the 
resources to tackle the problem but largely driven by profit margins 
remain apathetic to the needs of those afflicted by orphan diseases. 
Drugs that benefit the industrialized nations are prioritized over drugs 
that can benefit countries with individuals that are unable to pay the 
price of innovation.62 Under a framework of international laws 
securing a fair return on medical innovation, pharmaceutical 
companies could be enticed to fund research for orphan diseases. 
While the projects would not be categorized as lucrative, the eventual 
payoff of the initial investment and improved public image would 
suffice to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to undertake the 
research. Moreover, once return rates are globally coordinated, 
pharmaceutical companies can offset the cost of research for orphan 
diseases from their more successful products.  
D.  Rise in the Counterfeit Drug Market 
Disproportionately high prices and limited access to name brand 
medicines exacerbate the counterfeit drug market problem. The WHO 
explains, “[w]hen prices of medicines are high and price differentials 
between identical products exists there is a greater incentive to supply 
cheap counterfeit medicines.”63 The counterfeit drug market functions 
by supplying counterfeit drugs through traditional distribution 
 
60. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents - 
Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 314-15 (2013). 
61. Aronson, supra note 58, at 244. 
62. Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 37. 
63. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, WHO (Feb. 2006), 
available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/index1
.html [https://perma.cc/4QHC-PPVV]. 
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channels or directly to consumers.64 A counterfeit drug is “one which 
is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity 
and/or source.”65 
The inability to regulate the creation or distribution of counterfeit 
drugs creates a number of risks to public health. While some 
individuals might consciously purchase counterfeit drugs, the majority 
are inadvertent recipients of subpar medications.66 Counterfeit drugs 
“may include [products with the] correct ingredients but with fake 
packaging, with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients or 
with insufficient active ingredients.”67The most dangerous counterfeit 
drugs are those with incorrect compositions because of their potential 
health effects. For example, more than 500 people, mostly children, 
died from consuming medications “fraudulently or [] mistake[nly]” 
containing diethylene glycol, a poisonous solvent.68 
In addition to the health risk associated with counterfeit drugs, 
the healthcare industry must worry about the public’s lost sense of 
faith in the healthcare system. Many individuals with access to 
regular pharmaceutical treatments are skeptical of the system’s ability 
to produce positive results. Counterfeit drugs on the market only 
serve to reinforce apprehension against modern medicine.   
 
64. Growing Threat from Counterfeit Medicines, WHO (Apr. 2010), 
available at https://www/who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/4/10-020410/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/LX5Z-6FFY] (asserting that “international trade 
presents easy opportunities for counterfeiters to insert their products 
into the supply chain of legitimate pharmaceuticals and to disguise the 
source.”). 
65. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 63. 
66. See THE REAL DANGERS OF COUNTERFEIT DRUGS, PHARMA, available at 
http://pharma.webpackaging.com/issue1/healthcare/anti-
counterfeiting/the-real-dangers-of-counterfeit-drugs/ 
[https://perma.cc/JK5W-BMRU] (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (observing 
that easy access to popular drugs on the Internet since the late 1990s 
has led some unsuspecting buyers to purchase counterfeit drugs, while 
other consumers deliberately buy counterfeit drugs to avoid high 
treatment costs). 
67. Anna Gu, The Fight Against Counterfeit and Substandard 
Pharmaceuticals by Governments, International Agencies, and 
Professional Societies, in 1 COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: POLICY, 
ECONOMICS, AND COUNTERMEASURES 53, 53-54 (Albert I. Wertheimer & 
Perry G. Wang, eds., 2012).  
68. Counterfeit Drugs: Guidelines for the Development of Measures to 
Combat Counterfeit Drugs, WHO 13 (1999), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh1456e/4.html 
[https://perma.cc/L4DA-PJ48]; see generally L. J. Schep et al., 
Diethylene Glycol Poisoning, 47 CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY 525, 525-35 
(2009). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
A Fair Return Approach to Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing 
410 
V. Proposal: An International Panel of Neutral 
Individuals 
A potential solution to the problems that arise from having an 
uncoordinated, decentralized system is to establish an International 
Panel that will review national decisions to ensure that 
pharmaceutical companies receive adequate return on investments 
while ensuring that market prices reflect the ability of countries to 
pay for drugs. This body’s impartial nature will allow the members to 
determine the common interests between the issuing country and the 
pharmaceutical company that transcend beyond national interests.  
A. Special Board 
Disputes arising out of TRIPS are governed by the dispute 
settlement system instituted by the WTO and subject to the general 
rules and procedures for management of disputes.69 This system seeks 
to maintain a balance between the obligations and rights of members 
by addressing instances of unfair outcomes as a result of measures 
taken by other members.70 The dispute settlement mechanism 
instituted by the WTO is inadequate for resolving compulsory license 
disputes for pharmaceutical patents because pharmaceutical 
companies cannot appeal compulsory license decisions directly to a 
designated board. Further, the international health crisis distinguishes 
itself from all other intellectual property conflicts by its indisputable 
effect on human existence. Moreover, the effectiveness of the dispute 
settlement system continues to face criticism especially in regards to 
the developing nations’ ability to access the system and devote 
financial and legal resources to make it effective.71 Here, the 
International Panel will specifically focus on coordinating payments 
by countries to achieve a global system that induces the right amount 
of investment and distributes costs among countries based on their 
ability to pay.   
International support for the institution of an International Panel 
specifically created to address compulsory license disputes will remove 
the stigma associated with challenging compulsory licenses. A 
compulsory license is not intrinsically unfair, but may be unfair as 
applied/ in practice due to inadequate royalty rates. Marked economic 
differences and bargaining power disparities between Brazil and South 
 
69. Viviana Muñoz Tellez, Dispute Settlement Under the TRIPS Agreement: 
The United States-Brazil (2000) and United States-Argentina (2002) 
Patent Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERPRETATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 215, 
215 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).  
70. Id.   
71. Id. at 216.    
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Africa depict a perfect illustration of how a neutral board could 
sanction each government’s respective compulsory license, but under 
different terms. Shedding the stigma and allowing transparent review 
of compulsory licensing applications will benefit pharmaceutical 
companies, governments, and consumers. 
B. Board Composition 
The International Panel will be composed of seven standing 
members and closely resemble the Appellate Body of the WTO. Like 
the Appellate Body of the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
will appoint each member of the International Panel.72 The DSB is 
“made up of all member governments, usually represented by 
ambassadors,” thus, assuring uniform international representation.73 
Members of the WTO Appellate Body must be “individuals with 
recognized authority . . . demonstrated expertise in law, international 
trade and the subject-matter of the covered agreements generally.”74 
Following this example, the International Panel members must meet 
the same qualification with additional expertise in patent law and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Further, a staff of experts on investment in 
risk and innovation will support the members. Additionally, the 
members must be unaffiliated with any government, and be “broadly 
representative of the Membership of the WTO.”75 Each member will 
be elected for a four-year term, with the possibility of being 
reappointed once.76 Board members will be subject to the Rules of 
Conduct for the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes.77 Using this method for selecting board 
members will ensure each compulsory license is subject to the same 
review process and free of national bias.  
C. Review Process 
The International Panel will have appellate review over the 
remuneration established by the government issuing a compulsory 
license and will only entertain cases of compulsory licenses for 
pharmaceutical patents. The board can juxtapose the pharmaceutical 
 
72. Appellate Body, WTO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9NU6-8T8X] (last visited Jan 25, 2015) [Appellate 
Body Members, WTO]. 
73. Dispute Settlement, WTO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NP62-X4CL] (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
74. Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.  
75. Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72. 
76. Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.  
77. Appellate Body Members, WTO, supra note 72.  
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company’s research and development costs and other factors it sees fit 
with the nation’s need and accessibility concerns, taking into account 
the revenue that the pharmaceutical company earns from domestic 
sales and in other countries. Parties to a dispute will be expected to 
meet evidence thresholds to support their positions. Pharmaceutical 
companies challenging a compulsory license will have the burden of 
producing records that illustrate the cost to the pharmaceutical 
company for the specific drug and the issuing country must produce 
evidence of the country’s need for the drug and ability to pay. The 
board shall have absolute discretion to construe a party’s failure to 
cooperate as evidence of bad faith. 
As described earlier, when responding to inadequate royalty 
payments, WHO in collaboration with UNDP published an extensive 
set of guidelines for establishing “adequate” remuneration that 
countries issuing a compulsory license can use to determine adequate 
remuneration for a specific drug.78 But these guidelines still produce 
unsatisfactory results for pharmaceutical companies. In 2012, India 
determined the royalty rate for Bayer’s cancer drug using WHO’s 
Remuneration Guidelines but Bayer still appealed the rate.79 The 
existing guidelines, including WHO’s Remuneration Guidelines, 
impose a rigid equation for establishing adequate remuneration and 
tend to focus on concerns specific to the country of origin. So long as 
countries are free to choose which guidelines to follow and how to 
discount factors, pharmaceutical companies will continue to receive 
disagreeable and inconsistent royalty rates. The International Panel 
shall make use of the different formulas for remuneration and 
introduce flexibility into the calculation process while maintaining 
consistency across countries. For example, the board must have 
authority to retroactively entertain a dispute for a compulsory license 
issued for an emergency situation and design a payment plan so that 
the pharmaceutical company can be compensated.  
The International Panel will build on the formulas devised by 
WHO and other counties without committing to a single mechanism. 
The most notable difference between existing considerations and 
factors the neutral board will consider will be the capital investment 
spent on the specific drug by the pharmaceutical company. In Bayer 
v. Natco, Bayer’s challenge to the compulsory license was dismissed 
because Bayer’s inability to recover its investment did not pertain to 
the issue at hand. The Intellectual Property Appellate Board, 
Chennai reasoned that the “expenditure incurred by the appellant is 
not the criterion, nor does this chapter intend[] that the patentee be 
 
78. LOVE, supra note 27.    
79. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, et al. (Bayer Corp. v. India), Order No. 
223/2012 (India), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-223-
2012-OA-35-2012-PT-MUM.pdf [http://perma.cc/BDT3-PY32].. 
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enabled to recoup the amount spent.”80 India, like each government 
making the same argument, assumes the pharmaceutical company 
recovered its investment from market sales in the developed world. 
The fault in that reasoning is that without global coordination and 
parallel importation concerns pharmaceutical companies stand to lose 
the ability to actually recover their investment.81 
In order to secure a fair return for the labor and money-intensive 
investments, the International Panel must factor a pharmaceutical 
company’s investment costs into their decisions and cannot assume 
that the pharmaceutical company will recover the costs exclusively 
from the developed countries. Companies will not be awarded higher 
royalty rates to meet the company’s marketing needs or surplus 
profits but can expect to receive a fair return rate consistent with the 
monetary investments on research and development. Because not all 
drugs are successful and the incentive of pharmaceutical companies to 
invest in research and development depends on their ability to offset 
losses from some drugs with profits from their more successful drugs, 
pharmaceutical companies must be permitted to recover the cost of 
successful drugs. Pharmaceutical companies will need to provide 
extensive records of spending costs over the years and detailed 
accounts of the labor in order to fairly assess royalty rates. Although 
pharmaceutical companies will be reluctant to produce these 
documents, they will be incentivized by the higher likelihood of 
obtaining fair compensation if they comply.  
Litigation costs before the International Panel can replace the 
cost of futile challenges to the issuing country’s judicial system, and 
the public relations costs of protecting public image. The 
establishment of the International Panel should cause a sizable 
redistribution of spending that should reduce marketing costs in the 
long run. Eventually, the decision of the International Panel shall 
serve as precedent for future compulsory licenses, but it is crucial that 
countries and pharmaceutical companies alike continue to have access 
to this impartial review. 
D. Authority 
The Panel will be given authority to make final decisions on all 
compulsory matters under the supervision of WTO members. In 
accordance with WTO ideals, the decision to institute the board and 
the determination of its powers will be a product of a majority 
member decision. A declaration amending the original TRIPS 
agreement must therefore be brought into effect so that the board can 
 
80. Bayer Corp. v. India, Order No. 223/2012. 
81. Parallel Imports occur when a country imports a drug from another 
country where a lower price is charged for the drug. See Sykes, supra 
note 3, at 57.  
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function with the support of the international community. The United 
Nations has designated forty-eight countries as least-developed 
countries, thirty-four of which are currently members of the WTO.82 
The WTO’s process for making collective decisions involving all 
member nations83 and its broad international representation render the 
WTO the appropriate international organization to empower the 
International Panel to preside over compulsory license issues. 
The International Panel’s decisions will be appealable to the 
WTO Appellate Body, which shall be the only entity with authority 
to overturn the International Panel’s decision. Once the International 
Panel reaches a decision, the decision will be binding on both parties 
unless appealed to the WTO Appellate Body. Given the International 
Panel’s flexibility and impartial interest in the subject matter, the 
number of appeals to the WTO Appellate Body should be minimal. 
The neutral board shall have full authority to impose trade sanctions 
against any country refusing to comply with its resolutions. The 
Panel’s decisions must preempt national law and thus reinforce the 
notion of fairness for both parties involved.  
If a dispute arises between a country that is not a member of the 
WTO and a member-country, the board may extend temporary 
member status to the country for that proceeding. This temporary 
member status will be contingent on a contractual obligation to be 
bound by the International Panel’s final decision. Failure to adhere to 
the stipulations of the International Panel will result in trade 
sanctions. Additionally, the non-member country will be added to the 
WTO observer status country list, where the country will have the 
ability to follow discussions on subjects that pertain to them.84 If the 
non-member country abstains from WTO jurisdiction, the 
pharmaceutical company must resort to resolving the dispute through 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system or the issuing country’s judicial 
system.  
VI. Conclusion 
This Note has reviewed the shortcomings of compulsory licensing 
under the current framework of TRIPS and proposed the institution 
 
82. Least Developed Countries, WTO, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/47RT-7JQX] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
83. Whose WTO is it Anyway, WTO, available at 
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[https://perma.cc/LAL9-QUGZ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). 
84. International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status 
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of an International Panel with appellate review to exclusively 
entertain cases of compulsory licensing for pharmaceutical 
innovations. This Note does not suggest countries should forego initial 
attempts to obtain voluntary licenses, but instead provides patent 
holders a greater opportunity to obtain a fair return on their 
inventions even under compulsory licenses. Ultimately, the goal is to 
increase universal access to lifesaving drugs, but monetary constrains 
create a conflict of interest between investing in research and 
development and fair returns. The conflict of interest must be 
resolved by a third party, a neutral body of individuals, tasked with 
equalizing costs across national borders.
